Írta: Elena Moiseeva

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused a strategic shock in European nations. Despite the early warnings of American and British intelligence offices, many analysts did not believe at the time that an outbreak of a full-scale military action on the European continent was possible. Despite Russia having consistently demonstrated its willingness to use military action to realise its foreign policy goals and restore its sphere of influence (the loss of which Putin has often described as modern Russia’s greatest historical trauma), many deemed that launching a full-fledged assault against Ukraine would be simply too great a leap, and that the initial 180 000 troops training near the Ukrainian border would be insufficient to conquer and pacify Ukraine, especially without the element of surprise. In retrospect, we can conclude that analysts were right on that account, having witnessed the continuous militarisation of Russia required by the war. However, one aspect often overlooked in favour of the actual, physical military developments is the evolution of Russia’s justification for the military action used on the territory of Ukraine. The rhetoric is not at all homogenous, and has been shaped by multiple different factors– as we will see, it needed to adapt to serve both domestic political interests, to ideologize the Russian public opinion, to imitate international legalist approaches and to create a division between the emerging nations of the Global South and the liberal democracies of the West, and finally, to provide rhetorical ammunition to radical political actors in said liberal democracies (these can serve to erode political willingness to continue supporting Ukraine.) In the essay below, I also wish to highlight how the policymakers of the Russian Federation tried to create parallels to the justifications of military interventions by the United States, aiming to imitate the formal logic and the rhetoric of the military operations and thus create a façade of international legalism. Russia, by this stance, merely followed the rules of the current international order. This attempt at mimicking the US military interventions, as we will see, directly supported the goals of the rhetoric laid out above. By understanding what panels Russia uses, we can get a better glimpse of both contemporary Russia’s internal structure and its external ambitions in influencing the public opinion of the world at large.

Part I: The Incubator of Conflict (2020–2021) – The Denial of Agency and the Historical Imperative

1.1 The Intellectual Preconditioning: „On the Historical Unity”

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not a spontaneous reaction to immediate security dilemmas. It can be best described as a kinetic culmination of a long-term rhetorical project designed to deconstruct Ukrainian sovereignty. The cornerstone of this project was laid in July 2021 with the publication of Vladimir Putin’s essay, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. This text is not merely a historical survey; it is a policy document that reframed the relationship between Kyiv and Moscow from one of international relations to one of internal domestic management.

In this 5,000-word treatise, the Russian President articulated a thesis of historical determinism: that Russians and Ukrainians are „one people” effectively separated by the artificial borders of the Soviet collapse and the malign influence of external powers. The essay argues that the „wall” emerging between the two nations is a “great common misfortune and tragedy,” the result of “deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity”. This framing serves a critical strategic function: it strips the Ukrainian government of agency. Suppose Ukraine is not a sovereign actor but a vessel for foreign anti-Russian conspiracies. In that case, military action against it is not a war of aggression against a neighbour, but a liberation operation to rescue a „brotherly people” from a hostile occupation.

The essay explicitly warns that Ukraine can only be sovereign “in partnership with Russia”. This paradox, that sovereignty is conditional on alignment with Moscow, established the intellectual permission structure for the invasion. It signalled to the Russian elite that the status quo of the Minsk Agreements was no longer acceptable. Analysts noted at the time that the text was a “call to arms,” with drafts reportedly containing direct threats of military action that were excised from the final public version. The narrative established here—that Kyiv “simply does not and cannot have the right to possess Donbas” (or any other county for that matter as the whole state is fundamentally illegitimate and merely is a patchwork of constituent territories of other nations) and that its anti-Russian policy exposes it to the risk of losing statehood—was a clear precursor to the „denazification” rhetoric that would follow.

1.2 The Securitisation of Memory: From “Bandera” to “Genocide”

Alongside the historical argument, the Kremlin began to intensively securitise the cultural memory of World War II, using it as a lens to view contemporary Ukrainian politics. The term “followers of Bandera” became a metonym for any Ukrainian nationalist sentiment, collapsing the complex history of 20th-century Ukraine into a binary struggle between Soviet liberators and Nazi collaborators. This rhetorical manoeuvre allowed Russia to transpose the moral clarity of the “Great Patriotic War” onto the murky geopolitical conflict in the Donbas.

Throughout 2021, as the Minsk diplomatic track disintegrated, Russian rhetoric shifted from complaints about treaty non-compliance to urgent warnings of a humanitarian catastrophe. The Kremlin began to allege that the Ukrainian government was preparing a “blitzkrieg” against the Donbas, necessitating a pre-emptive posture. By late 2021, the term “genocide” moved from the fringes of nationalist blogs to the centre of presidential discourse. Putin and other officials claimed that the situation in Donbas “looks like genocide” referencing the systematic persecution of Russian speakers.

This specific charge of genocide was not incidental. It was a legalistic preparation to invoke the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine of the UN. By framing the conflict as an attempt by „neo-Nazis” to physically annihilate a protected group (Russian speakers), Moscow was preparing a casus belli that would mimic the Western justification for intervention in Kosovo. The accusation was bolstered by state media reports — later debunked or shown to be staged — of Ukrainian shelling of residential areas, sabotage attempts, and mass refugee flows into Russia. In the UN Security Council, Russian representatives claimed that Ukraine was “sabotaging” the Minsk agreements and “proceeding with bombardments of residential quarters,” creating a narrative of imminent slaughter that required immediate external intervention. The violation of the Minsk agreement and the genocide can thus be regarded as the second ideological pillar that not just allowed but required Russia’s military intervention. By portraying Kyiv as dismissive of the legally binding Minsk agreements, Russia wished to prove that the only way for the country to reach its goals in the international arena remained that of a full-scale assault.

1.3 The „Anti-Russia” Project

A third pillar of the pre-war rhetoric was the concept of Ukraine as an „Anti-Russia.” This term, popularised by Putin and his ideologues, posited that Western powers were transforming Ukraine into a platform specifically designed to threaten Russian existence and statehood, with the final aim of dismantling the Russian Federation and enslaving the remaining, separated constituent parts, to impose Western Hegemony over them. This went beyond military infrastructure; it encompassed language, culture and church canonical territory. The narrative claimed that the West was building a „hostile enclave” on Russia’s historic frontiers.

This existential anxiety was distinct from the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. It was intimate and fratricidal. The rhetoric suggested that the „Anti-Russia” project was changing the very genetic and spiritual code of the Ukrainian people, turning them into „monsters”, “freaks”, or „zombies” programmed to hate Russians. This dehumanisation was essential for the war effort, as it allowed Russian soldiers to view their opponents not as fellow Slavs and especially not as a brotherly nation, but as brainwashed, corrupted vessels of the seeds of a future foreign invasion. This theme would later manifest quite literally in the „biolabs” conspiracy theory.

Part II: The Invasion Rationale (February 2022) – Casus Belli and the Art of Legal Mimicry

2.1 The February 24 Address

Vladimir Putin’s address on the morning of February 24, 2022, stands as the definitive text of the war’s justification, synthesising historical grievance, security paranoia, and international legalese into a single directive for the Special Military Operation (SMO). The speech was carefully constructed to mirror the structure of American presidential addresses announcing military interventions, checking specific boxes of international law to provide a veneer of legitimacy.

The primary legal vehicle for the invasion was Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which guarantees the right of individual or collective self-defence. By recognising the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR) on February 21, Russia created two new „sovereign” entities that could then ostensibly request military assistance from Moscow, as they did not have de facto control over their de jure territories, them being under “foreign occupation”. This bureaucratic choreography allowed Putin to claim that Russian troops were entering Ukraine not as invaders, but as allies and peacekeepers fulfilling a treaty obligation to protect nascent states from aggression.

The speech identified the enemy not merely as the Ukrainian armed forces, but as the „Empire of Lies” — the collective West, itself not being much more than the extension of the influence of the United States and a tool for enforcing its interests — suggesting that the war was a truth-telling mission against a deceitful global hegemon. Putin demanded that „those who seized and continue to hold power in Kiev” immediately cease hostilities, framing the invasion as a peace enforcement operation gone wrong due to Ukrainian intransigence. The goals of „demilitarisation” and „denazification” were presented as necessary measures to remove a „gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis” who had taken the Ukrainian people hostage, with whom it became increasingly impossible to negotiate and who themselves would not stop until Russia is completely subdued, its statehood ripped away or completely dismantled, its population, all but enslaved or worse.

2.2 The „Puppet State” Narrative: A Comparative Analysis with Afghanistan

A recurring theme in Russian rhetoric from 2022 to 2025 is the characterisation of Ukraine not as an enemy combatant, but as a „colony” or „puppet” of the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other officials have repeatedly described the Zelensky government as a „puppet regime” that is „totally dependent” on Washington, executing orders to fight Russia „to the last Ukrainian”.

This rhetoric serves to delegitimise the Ukrainian resistance. If Zelensky is merely a puppet, then his refusal to surrender is not an act of patriotism but an act of foreign coercion. This mirrors the US rhetoric regarding the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in 2001, where the regime was viewed not as a legitimate government but as a harbour for terrorists (Al-Qaeda) and a criminal enterprise holding the population hostage.

However, a critical divergence exists. The US argued that the Taliban had lost sovereignty by failing to prevent attacks emanating from its soil. Russia argues that Ukraine never had real sovereignty to begin with or lost it during the „coup” of 2014, rendering it a terra nullius open to intervention. The Russian narrative insists on external control: Zelensky is portrayed as physically unable to make peace because his „handlers” in Washington and London forbid it.

2.3 „Denazification” vs. „Spreading Democracy”

The term „denazification” serves as a semantic anchor for Russian domestic support, tapping into the deep well of Soviet memory. In contemporary Russian history (or more accurately, memory politics), the Second World War is characterised as nothing short of an inflexion point in Soviet history, framed as an event in which the entire state and its people were endangered by a foreign invasion, but the heroic Red Army managed not only to push back the enemy and preserve statehood, but indeed remake the world order in the process. Denazification, as a communication panel, therefore, for the modern Russian audience, means both an existential threat and a moral responsibility to purge. However, functionally, it acts as a mirror to the American concept of „Spreading Democracy” or „Regime Change.” Both concepts operate on the premise that the target government is fundamentally illegitimate and that its removal is a moral imperative that supersedes national sovereignty.

In the case of Libya (2011), President Obama argued that while broadening the mission to include explicit regime change would be a mistake, the world would be „better off” without Gaddafi, and military action was taken to protect civilians from a ruler who had lost legitimacy. The US intervention was framed by the „democratic impulses” of the Arab Spring. Similarly, Russia’s „denazification” posits that the Ukrainian government is structurally illegitimate due to its ideological composition (alleged Nazism) and that its removal is a service to the Ukrainian people themselves

Where the US justification often relies on the absence of democracy, the Russian justification relies on the presence of fascism. Both frameworks allow the intervening power to claim the moral high ground, positioning themselves as liberators rather than conquerors. Russia’s rhetoric essentially argues:

“You invade countries to install democracy; we invade countries to remove Nazis. It is the same logic.”

Part III: The Biological Front – A Case Study in „Reverse Cargo Cult” Science

3.1 Constructing the Threat: From Pathogens to Migratory Birds

Perhaps the most elaborate and surreal justification developed by Russia post-2022 involves the allegation of a vast network of US-funded biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. The other mentioned WMD would be the recurring idea that Ukraine intended to acquire, develop or utilise a “dirty bomb”. The biolab narrative evolved rapidly from vague accusations of „cooperation” to highly specific, albeit scientifically dubious, briefings by the Russian Ministry of Defence.

General Igor Kirillov, head of the Russian radiation, chemical, and biological protection troops, became the face of this campaign. His briefings presented a litany of terrifying scenarios:

• Specific Pathogens: The Ministry of Defence claimed to have discovered evidence of the emergency destruction of dangerous pathogens, specifically citing „654 containers with anthrax pathogen” and „422 containers with cholera pathogen” at the Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute in Odesa. The inclusion of precise numbers was a rhetorical tactic to simulate evidentiary rigour.
• Delivery Systems: The narrative escalated to include allegations that the US and Ukraine were developing „specially trained migratory birds” and bats to disperse these pathogens over Russian territory. This claim posits a level of biological control (directing birds to cross borders with specific payloads) that borders on science fiction but serves to heighten the sense of an insidious, uncontrollable threat.
• Ethnic Weapons: Most provocatively, Russian officials claimed the labs were working on „bio-agents” capable of selectively targeting „Slavic ethnicity”. Scientific experts and Western governments have repeatedly debunked this as biologically impossible, given the genetic homogeneity of human populations, particularly between Russians and Ukrainians. However, the claim resonates with the „Anti-Russia” narrative—that the West is seeking a scientific method to exterminate the Russian people.
• Super-Soldiers: The narrative also ventured into body horror, with claims that Ukrainian soldiers were being turned into „cruel monsters” through secret experiments, explaining their battlefield resilience not as morale but as biological tampering.

3.2 The Shadow of Colin Powell: Comparing Iraq and Ukraine

The structural similarities between Russia’s biolabs narrative and the United States’ justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq are striking and likely intentional. Russia has weaponised the memory of the US failure to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq to immunise itself against criticism. This is a „reverse cargo cult” approach: mimicking the forms of Western intelligence presentation (satellite photos, intercepted documents, technical briefings) to produce a similar, albeit fabricated, casus belli.

• The „Smoking Gun” Presentation: Just as Secretary of State Colin Powell presented satellite images, intercepts, and the infamous vial of anthrax simulant to the UN Security Council in February 2003 to prove Iraq’s non-compliance, Russia called specific UN Security Council meetings to present its „evidence” of biological activities in Ukraine.
• The Language of Imminence: The US claimed Saddam Hussein had „no compunction about using” and that the „smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud”. Similarly, Russia claimed the biological threat was immediate and that Ukraine was preparing to use these agents, necessitating a pre-emptive strike to „save” the world from a biological catastrophe.
• The „Terrorist” Link: The Bush administration laboured to link Iraq’s WMDs to Al-Qaeda, asserting a nexus between tyrants and terrorists. Russia linked the biolabs to „Nazis” and „saboteurs,” creating a similar nexus between unconventional weapons and ideological extremism.

A critical difference lies in the reception. While the US claims were initially accepted by many Western allies (though contested by others), Russia’s claims have been categorically rejected by the UN and the international scientific community. However, the narrative is not primarily designed to convince the West; it is intended to convince the domestic Russian audience and the Global South (China, Africa) that the US is a reckless proliferator of biological terror, thereby justifying Russia’s defiance and to at least plant the seed of uncertainty about the intentions of the US’s involvement in Ukraine.

Part IV: The Kosovo Precedent and the Weaponisation of International Law

4.1 The Mirror of 1999: Transforming Trauma into Precedent

Russian foreign policy has been haunted by the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, viewing it as the original sin of the post-Cold War order, where the West prioritised „humanitarian” concerns over state sovereignty. In the 2020-2025 period, the Kremlin transformed this grievance into a legal sword. Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov have repeatedly and explicitly cited the „Kosovo precedent” and the subsequent 2010 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion to argue that the declarations of independence by Donetsk and Luhansk (and later Kherson and Zaporizhzhia) did not require the consent of the central government in Kyiv.

The logic is explicit and legalistic: If the West could carve Kosovo out of Serbia without UN Security Council authorisation to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, Russia claims the identical right to carve Donbas out of Ukraine to prevent a „genocide.” Lavrov has stated, „The precedent that the Western countries created themselves… they recognised Kosovo’s secession from Serbia… Russia is doing exactly what Crimea is doing now”.

4.2 „Remedial Secession” and the R2P Distortion

The concept Russia mimics here is „Remedial Secession”—the idea that a people have a right to secede if their basic human rights are being systematically violated by the parent state.

• US/NATO in Kosovo (1999): The justification was „humanitarian intervention” to stop ethnic cleansing by Milošević’s forces. President Clinton emphasised that the action was necessary because „we care about saving innocent lives” and preventing a wider war in Europe. The intervention led to an international protectorate and eventual independence, but notably not annexation by a neighbouring power.
• Russia in Ukraine (2014/2022): Russia uses the same language of „protecting civilians” and „self-determination”. However, unlike Kosovo, the outcome was the formal annexation of these territories into the Russian Federation.

Russia attempts to blur this critical distinction (independence vs. annexation) by arguing that the people of Donbas „chose to be with their Motherland”. This shifts the justification from purely remedial (stopping harm) to irredentist (reclaiming historical land). The US justification for Kosovo relied on the violation of human rights by the sovereign; Russia’s justification, while initially relying on the same principle in the case of Donetsk and Luhansk, later morphed into the rhetoric of the historical unity of the people, where the independent, but internationally not recognized counties/countries not just simply can secede unilaterally but also can vote to become parts of other states via referendums. This effectively returns to the basic concept that the sovereign borders of Ukraine are illegitimate historical accidents.

Furthermore, Russia’s use of the „Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) language is highly selective. While the West (and the UN Secretary-General) argue that R2P does not authorise unilateral invasion without Security Council approval, Russia argues that the West set the precedent of ignoring the Security Council in 1999 and 2003, thereby licensing Russia to do the same. This creates a „common law” of great power interventionism where Russia claims the same prerogatives as the United States. Whether the so-called collective West approves of the presence of this bias or not is irrelevant. For the domestic audience, this serves as legitimising the invasion even if in violation of the international order and restores a sense of national pride, while in the Global South and emerging countries, it calls out a bias in the international order towards the US and proposes the idea that Russia is in fact a champion that is willing to challenge this highly asymmetric status quo by sticking to its might to act.