Írta: Elena Moiseeva – Graduate Researcher in International Relations, MA in International Relations, [Corvinus University of Budapest]
Historical context
The US Congress adopted the Foreign Agents Registration Act (hereinafter FARA) in 1938² specifically to target lobbying and consulting firms acting on behalf of the Nazi German government and Soviet Communist agents. In Russia, the foreign agents’ law takes roots from a hallmark of Soviet law, which criminalized foreign influence as „counter-revolutionary activity” and „anti-Soviet agitation or propaganda.”³
While the US FARA has undergone amendments since 1938 such as refining the law’s scope, shifting administration to the Attorney General, expanding definitions and exemptions, increasing penalties, and focusing more on political activities and lobbying, the Russian legislation, in contrast, is seen as a reaction to contemporary political dynamics and is more focused on suppressing dissent and controlling civil society. While the Soviet Union controlled foreign influence through centralized state policy and ideological restrictions, modern Russia’s „foreign agent” law targets civil society, media, and individuals with broad labelling requirements and administrative burdens, effectively suppressing and silencing independent civil society actors and media under the guise of transparency.
First adapted in Russia in 2012, the „foreign agents” legislation (Федеральный закон № 121-ФЗ от 20 июля 2012 года) has evolved tremendously over a decade, impacting Russian NGOs and civil society. Originally, the law was positioned as a response to perceived threats from foreign-funded NGOs, which are seen as tools of foreign governments, particularly the US, to influence domestic politics. In 2017, the scope was expanded to media outlets and individuals by 2019, and the vague team „Political activity” started to include any criticism of authorities and no proof of foreign funding was required anymore as „Foreign influence” now included non-financial support (e.g., organizational or methodological aid), and by 2022 it reached full criminalization when the collective „under foreign influence” law (Федеральный закон „О контроле за деятельностью лиц, находящихся под иностранным влиянием” от 14.07.2022 N 255-ФЗ, effective December 2022) replaced the „foreign agent” law.
Legal framework
After 12 years, the implementation of foreign influence legislation in Russia has highlighted issues in distinguishing between genuine foreign agents and unpatriotic citizens who oppose state policies. The arbitrary nature of the law leads to biased judicial outcomes since the law is intentionally vague, allowing authorities to label individuals as „foreign agents” at will. The law promotes legal nihilism, since „Foreign agents” laws grant the executive branch unchecked power, undermining the rule of law.
By 2024 over 900 entities and individuals had been labelled as foreign agents in Russia, including exiled media, making the law effectively a quasi-legal repressive mechanism, undermining democratic safeguards.
Legal penalties
The legal consequences of being labelled a „foreign agent” differ significantly between the two countries. In the U.S., the law primarily aims to ensure transparency and does not impose severe restrictions on the activities of designated individuals or organisations. Conversely, in Russia, the designation comes with stringent restrictions, including limitations on funding, operational capabilities, and public engagement.
The Russian legislation is portrayed as a means to control and intimidate organisations that challenge the state, exemplified by the case of „International Memorial”, a vital organization dedicated to preserving the memory of political repression in the USSR as well as advocating for human rights and democratic values in Russia.
Moreover, the US law makes a distinction between types of foreign principals. Only a person acting on behalf of a foreign government or political party must be registered under FARA. A person acting on behalf of a foreign company or organization is exempted from registering under FARA if they register instead under the less burdensome Lobbying Disclosure Act.
Financing
FARA requires individuals and organizations acting on behalf of foreign entities to disclose their funding sources and activities. However, it does not impose outright restrictions on receiving foreign funding. Instead, the focus is on transparency and accountability, ensuring that the public is informed about the foreign influence on domestic political activities. This approach allows organizations to continue their work while being transparent about their funding sources
In Russia, these organizations face significant limitations in receiving funding from foreign sources. The law is designed to create a hostile environment for their operational capabilities, making it difficult for them to secure necessary financial support. The designation as a „foreign agent” not only stigmatizes the organization but also leads to administrative and legal challenges that can further complicate its funding efforts.
Russian foreign agents law operates as if international funders issued direct instructions to their grant recipients on a principal-agent basis, instead of proof of performance of the grant, but they do not dictate the grant recipient’s actions the way a principal does to an agent. The US law does not assume that an organization or a person receiving funds from a foreign power is a foreign agent.
The US law focuses on lobbying activities and is much narrower in its reach and scope compared to the Russian-style laws. A key difference is exemptions for humanitarian aid organizations, scientific or academic institutions, or media organizations as per FARA law. Consequently, in the US, the emphasis on transparency allows for a more open civil society, where organizations can engage with foreign entities without facing punitive measures solely based on their funding sources.
Conclusion
The US Foreign Agents Registration Act focuses on transparency for foreign-funded lobbying and political activities, while Russia’s foreign agents’ law is used to suppress dissent by arbitrarily labelling individuals and organizations as foreign agents, imposing severe restrictions and stifling civil society. The U.S. law allows for greater freedom and exemptions, whereas the Russian law creates a hostile environment for opposition and independent media.
Other examples of Foreign Agents law
It appears that if a state chooses to implement legislation related to Foreign Agents, it follows one of the paths, established either by the US FARA or Russian-style foreign influence law.
Georgia foreign agents’ law
The foreign agents’ law in Georgia has been a contentious issue, reflecting broader political and social dynamics within the country. This law, which was adopted by the Georgian parliament in May 2024, has sparked significant domestic and international reactions. The law mandates that organizations receiving foreign funding must register as foreign agents, a move that has been criticized for potentially stifling civil society and aligning with similar legislation in Russia. In fact, the Russian and Georgian foreign influence laws are strikingly similar, with the Georgian law often referred to as “Russian Law 2.0”. This means that the Georgian law casts a far wider net over Georgian society than the US law does over US society, respectively.
While Russia introduced its law gradually, Georgia attempted to implement a more comprehensive version all at once. Such adoption of the foreign agents’ law has resulted in a strong backlash from the majority of Western countries. The US imposed sanctions on members of the Georgian Dream party, and Germany has effectively halted Georgia’s EU accession process. In contrast to the Western criticism, the Hungarian government has shown support for Georgia’s ruling party. Hungary has vetoed a unified EU statement condemning Georgia, indicating a divergence in the EU’s approach towards Georgia’s situation.
In summary, the foreign agents bill in Georgia represents a pivotal moment in the country’s legislative landscape, with significant implications for civil liberties, international relations, and the functioning of civil society.
Kyrgyzstan
Another example of Russia’s foreign influence law’s copycat includes Kyrgyzstan’s abusive “foreign representatives” law, signed in April 2024. Copied almost entirely from the Russian equivalent, the law would apply the stigmatizing designation of “foreign representative” to any nongovernmental organization that receives foreign funding and engages in vaguely defined “political activity”, potentially encompassing a wide range of civil society actions. Both Russia and Kyrgyzstan fail to specify a funding threshold.
The adoption of this law is seen as part of a broader trend of increasing authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan.
The implementation of foreign influence laws in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia has significantly impacted independent media in both countries through financial burdens, stigmatization, and institutional harassment. Kyrgyzstan’s crackdown reflects a shift toward authoritarianism under President Japarov, while Georgia’s law jeopardizes its democratic future and EU integration.
Israel
Israel’s approach to regulating foreign influence seemingly mirrors FARA. Passed in 2016, the new enhanced version of Israel’s foreign influence law requires Israeli non-profit groups that receive more than half their funding, directly or indirectly, from foreign governments to note that fact in communications with the public and with government officials, and to refer readers of their reports to donor lists posted on the Israeli non-profit registrar’s website.
While these regulations aim to enhance transparency regarding the foreign financial sources of these organizations, particularly those that engage in political activities or advocacy, critics argue that Israel’s law unfairly targets organizations that oppose the Israeli government’s views. This includes organizations run by Palestinian citizens of Israel, or advocacy or research groups associated with the political left – that is, opponents of the current government. Most of them are critical of the Israeli government’s policies regarding Palestinians, asylum-seekers and other non-Jews.
As a result, the similarity to Russian foreign influence law is that Israeli legislation also targets NGOs receiving foreign funding, potentially stigmatizing and delegitimizing these NGOs affiliated with human rights groups and left-leaning politics, exempting certain Zionist organizations.
At the same time, Israeli legislation establishes a certain threshold that targets organizations receiving more than 50% of their funding from foreign governments. Israeli law also focuses on transparency and reporting requirements rather than aggressively shutting down undesirable NGOs and issuing criminal charges.
Essentially, it is worth noting that Israel has cited the US FARA as inspiration for its law as well, although analysts argue that it more closely resembles the Russian model. Both laws have faced international criticism for potentially undermining civil society and freedom of association
Australia
Australia’s 2018 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (“FITS”) Act could serve as an example of foreign influence law that closely resembles US FARA. FITS defines the “registrable activities” that, if undertaken, require a person to register under the Act. FITS does not specifically target financing or funding by foreign principals. Instead, it focuses on the activities undertaken on behalf of these foreign entities, such as Parliamentary and General Political Lobbying, Communications and Disbursement Activities: Any public communications Payments made for the purpose of influencing governmental decisions and processes.
The main challenge FITS faces is its ineffectiveness. In June 2024, a statutory review conducted by the Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) highlighted concerns regarding the scheme’s limited effectiveness, including low registration numbers and minimal compliance enforcement. The Australian Government agreed with most of the committee’s recommendations for substantial reforms aimed at improving the scheme’s transparency outcomes. While both acts aim to increase transparency in foreign influence activities, FARA’s longer history, more detailed disclosure requirements, and increased enforcement in recent years have made it more effective than FITS in preventing foreign influence.
Conclusion
The adoption of foreign agents’ laws varies significantly across countries, often reflecting broader political dynamics. While laws like FARA and FITS emphasize transparency, Russian-style foreign influence laws tend to impose restrictive measures that limit civil society engagement. While the Russian government asserts that its foreign influence law mirrors the US FARA, a comparative analysis reveals substantial differences in scope, enforcement, and intent. In contrast, Russia’s foreign agents law operates as a repressive instrument that imposes severe restrictions on NGOs, media, and individuals critical of the government. The law’s broad and vague definitions enable discretionary enforcement, allowing authorities to stifle dissent and suppress civil society under the pretext of regulating foreign influence. The designation as a foreign agent in Russia entails administrative burdens, financial restrictions, public stigmatization, and legal consequences, effectively impeding the ability of independent organizations to function.
Thus, while both laws nominally address foreign influence, Russia’s foreign influence legislation serves as a mechanism for political control rather than a framework for transparency, fundamentally differing from the U.S. approach.
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan’s recent legislative changes suggest a growing trend toward restrictive foreign influence laws, whereas Israel and Australia have maintained relatively moderate approaches focused on disclosure rather than punitive enforcement.
Table 1. US FARA applicability scheme
Sources:
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