Written by: Emilie Sterna
03 June 2025
Although often neglected by the world powers during the Cold War, Central Asia is a region full of resources. This region is rich in natural assets, holding significant reserves of oil, natural gas, and minerals, as well as fertile farmland. Most importantly, this area occupies a strategic position due to its location at the crossroads of major powers and spheres of influence, including China, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe. Since the beginning of the 21st century, this geographical area has regained an interest that has become almost crucial for countries such as China, Russia, and India. Nowadays, Central Asia has become an important crossing point for trade, particularly for trade from Europe to Xinjiang in western China. Long seen as an emerging power, India is increasingly asserting itself on the international stage through strong economic growth, active diplomacy, and effective soft power. Although it still faces competition from Pakistan and China, India could have a significant global impact in the coming decades. Like the other major powers, India is therefore taking an interest in Central Asia. In 2015, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India strengthened its commitment to the region by touring all of its countries. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister expressed his desire to ‘reconnect’ with Central Asia. Despite the absence of a shared border, India is seeking strategic partnerships with the states of Central Asia. This article aims to analyse how India manages to exert lasting influence in Central Asia by balancing strategic opportunities and geopolitical constraints.
The foundations of India’s strategy in Central Asia
From the 16th to the 19th century, India and Central Asia maintained strong military, economic, and cultural relations. The period is often described as a „golden age” due to the extensive exchanges between the two regions. This era was initiated by the rise to power of the Mughals in India at the beginning of the 16th century. Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, originated from the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia (now divided among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). After suffering several defeats, he left his homeland to confront the Uzbeks and established his empire in India, which subsequently became the adopted homeland of him and his successors. Nevertheless, the Mughals maintained a strong connection to their Central Asian origins. This cultural affinity often led the Mughal monarchs to favour nobles of Turkish descent
and to honour Sufi Islamic religious leaders, thereby promoting commercial and cultural relations between India and Central Asia. Trade between the regions was flourishing, with India’s main exports including textiles, spices, indigo, and slaves, while Central Asia exported horses, fruit, and cotton. Artistic and literary exchanges also prospered during this period. Intellectuals, artists, and scientists from Central Asia joined the Mughal courts, contributing to a vibrant cultural milieu, particularly in mathematics, astronomy, literature, and poetry. This intense cultural exchange left a lasting impact on the art, culture, and science of the Indian subcontinent. For example, the Taj Mahal stands as a striking symbol of the fusion of Timurid influences and Central Asian architectural heritage, combining Persian, Turkish, and Indian styles. However, the relationship between India and Central Asia began to decline in the 19th century following the Russian conquest of the region. The Sovietisation of Central Asia further complicated trade relations, as Indian merchants encountered an increasingly hostile environment, leading to the gradual closure of markets. Since then, India had not expressed its desire to renew strong relations with Central Asia until the end of the Cold War. Later, at the begging of the 21st century, India launched a new policy to strengthen its partnerships with Central Asian countries.
India introduced the Connect Central Asia Policy in the 2010s, representing a new economic and security strategy. This policy was launched by Edappakath Ahamed, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs at the time, in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, in June 2012. This foreign policy aims to diversify regional partnerships and foster closer integration into the Eurasian geopolitical dynamics. This initiative emerges at a time when India seeks to catch up with other global powers that already exert influence in the region, particularly China and Russia. Furthermore, the policy serves as a strategic counterbalance to China’s infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.
Connect Central Asia Policy emphasises its political, economic, and cultural commitments, and is structured around the 4 Cs: Commerce, Connectivity, Consular Services, and Community. As part of this approach, India has established an annual forum known as the India-Central Asia Dialogue. This forum provides a platform for discussion and cooperation among all countries involved in India’s policy, with the purpose of improving regional conditions and offering policy recommendations to the relevant governments. The Connect Central Asia Policy covers a wide range of areas, including the economy, politics, energy, education, communications, and culture. For example, India is planning to establish an India-Central Asia University in Kyrgyzstan, as well as
several medical centres. As part of its development partnership programme, India is actively contributing to capacity building and the development of human resources. In particular, India is seeking to establish air connections with countries in the region, as well as investing in energy and water projects to diversify its energy supply. Moreover, India is enhancing its communication networks by utilising the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway line, which was completed in 2014. This line facilitates commercial transport between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, offering a strategic alternative to traditional routes. For India, this line is crucial, as it enables the country to consolidate its trade with Central Asia while reducing its dependence on sea routes dominated by China and other regional powers.
Iran is also a key actor in the Connect Central Asia Policy, primarily due to its port at Chabahar. Additionally, Afghanistan is a major partner for India, serving as a crucial transit country for goods travelling to Central Asia. Consequently, India promotes projects like the TAPI gas pipeline, intended to transport gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. This project reflects India’s efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce reliance on the Middle East, with particular interest in Turkmen gas and Kazakh uranium. Although the TAPI gas pipeline project was initiated in Turkmenistan in December 2015, its construction has faced significant delays, especially in Afghanistan. Once completed, this project will enable India to secure natural gas supplies from Central Asia while strengthening its ties with these countries. Overall, the Connect Central Asia Policy has had a beneficial impact in strengthening relations among the Central Asian countries, but many challenges persist, particularly in terms of infrastructure.
India’s Economic Cooperation and Military Collaboration in Central Asia
Economic cooperation and infrastructure projects play a crucial role in India’s influence on Central Asia. India is undertaking diplomatic initiatives to strengthen its relations with countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, where it is involved in projects related to energy, water and infrastructure development. However, it is also providing support to countries outside Central Asia to facilitate access to trade corridors. As India does not share borders with any of the five Central Asian countries, it must also focus on projects outside the region. One such project is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a maritime, rail and road network linking India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. This 7,200-kilometre project was first signed in 2000 and has recently regained interest. One of the major problems with this network
is the difference in railway gauges standards. Russia’s gauge is 1.52 metres, whereas the standard gauge is 1.435 metres. Although this difference is small, it has a significant impact and could contribute to the lack of direct connectivity between the different networks. As a result, India’s “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy and the opening up of the port of Chabahar to Central Asia are mainly designed to counter China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. However, Iranian-Indian relations are deteriorating, particularly regarding gas contracts. Tehran is accused of favouring China, and India is criticised for its late payments. Furthermore, India is an ally of the United States, so the difficult relationship between Iran and the United States complicates matters for India. Additionally, India is also an active participant in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it seeks to strengthen economic cooperation with member countries, including the five Central Asian states.
In response to security challenges in the region, India has developed significant military and security partnerships in Central Asia, particularly with Tajikistan, as part of its broader strategy to increase its regional influence. These partnerships include the Farkhor air base, which is located close to the Afghan border and enables India to monitor activities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. India has operated the Farkhor base since 2002, following the ban on Indian aircraft flying over Pakistani territory. This presence has contributed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan following the decline of the Taliban in 2001. Moreover, the base functions as a counterweight to Chinese and Russian influence in the region, offering Central Asian countries a strategic alternative. India has also established other security and military partnerships. For example, it financed much of the Ayni military base, also known as the Gissar military airfield, located in Tajikistan. This represents the second air base under Indian influence in the region. This partnership primarily aims to combat terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan. These partnerships demonstrate strengthened military cooperation between India and Central Asia. Furthermore, India has provided military training and equipment to enhance security in the region. Therefore, these partnerships are crucial for countering regional threats and enhancing India’s strategic influence.
India’s influence and Its Competitors in the Region
Although India aims to enhance its image in Central Asia through soft power, it faces challenges from other major powers such as China, and Russia, that are also deploying these same strategies. First of all, in its strategy towards Central Asia, India is using education to spread its culture to these countries, especially through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, where India ranks among the top performers in this area of expertise. It therefore decided to allocate 645 places for Eurasian participants in 2012-2013 so that they could join the programme. Of these 645 places, 435 are earmarked for Central Asian countries, which represent more than two-thirds of the total places. Secondly, India has also spread its art throughout Central Asia. Bollywood cinema has been a great success in the region, particularly in Afghanistan, and this has contributed to a positive and idealised image of India in the countries of the region. There are also yoga programs and institutions for teaching Hindi to Central Asian students. Finally, Narendra Modi also recalled the solid foundation that India and Central Asia share. These are demonstrations of soft power. Infrastructure projects to improve connections between India and Central Asia are also part of the soft power strategy. India is also using its status as a democracy to project a positive image, which could potentially appeal to Central Asia, which is a region constantly striving to free itself from Russian influence, while at the same time seeking to avoid a situation where countries find themselves caught between Chinese and Russian influence. This makes it easier for India to assert itself. However, India still faces challenges in promoting its influence in Central Asia. Although Central Asia is seeking to diversify its sources of influence, the dominant presence of China and Russia in the region leaves India little room for manoeuvre, as it faces stiff competition to assert its influence. In addition, tensions with Pakistan and the uncertain situation in Afghanistan, where terrorism is on the rise, are complicating the implementation of India’s strategy.
In terms of competition with other powers, Russia and China are the most influential countries in the region. Firstly, Russia was a major historical actor in the region. Although the countries of Central Asia have been independent since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s influence remains an important present in the region. For instance, the Russian language is still widely used for communication in their exchanges, which is a major advantage for Russia. The political and economic relations between Russia and Central Asia are very rich and continue to be important for some Central Asian countries, even as they seek to reduce Russian influence. Russia is seeking to strengthen its power through organisations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which promises to provide security for its five member countries, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), of which only Kazakhstan is a member. These two organisations are consolidating their economic cooperation. However, China has been gaining more influence than Russia in recent years. China plays a very important and major role in economic exchanges with Central Asia. Firstly, China launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, coupled with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), created in 2001 by China along with four Central Asian countries (except Turkmenistan). Consequently, China is strengthening its economic cooperation and development in the region. For instance, China has invested massively in Central Asia, increasing from 1 billion US dollars in 2000 to 50 billion in 2013. In addition, China is taking advantage of its Xinjiang region, which is geographically close to Central Asia and rich in natural resources, both to stabilise the region in the face of external threats and movements by Uyghurs, considered separatist by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and to create a Central Asia-Xinjiang corridor, in order to increase its energy sources to support its growth. Besides, Xinjiang is also a Turkic-speaking region with a Uyghur population, which helps bring the two regions closer together. Like India, China is using soft power in the region, mainly by establishing Confucius Institutes to promote its culture and language, with the very first Confucius Institute in Tashkent in Uzbekistan, demonstrating China’s crucial interest in Central Asia. Other countries and organisations competing with India in the region, including European Union, with its TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) programme created in 1993, the United States, South Korea with its Eurasia Initiative, Japan with its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, and Turkey, which also have a small presence in Central Asia.
In conclusion, India has a historic and cultural legacy dating from the 16th to the 19th centuries, marked by trade and cross-cultural influences in the arts, mathematics, and astronomy. In 2014, under the mandate of Narendra Modi, India consolidated its relationship with Central Asia by establishing the Connect Central Asia Policy. This policy aims to strengthen economic, energy, and security partnerships. India is also leveraging its influence through major infrastructure projects to reduce dependence on Chinese networks. Additionally, India is building security partnerships in the region, including military air bases in Tajikistan to counter terrorism. In terms of soft power, India is using its education system and Bollywood cinema to spread its culture to attract the region and to improve its image. However, India faces competition from Russia and China, which both have significant influence in Central Asia. Overall, these initiatives have strengthened the relations between India and Central Asia and are part of a continuously evolving geopolitical context in which India seeks to position itself as a strategic actor in the region.
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