Overview of the Democratic Republic of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A country that is less appreciated than it is supposed to be, and even less known as it deserves. With its 103 million people, the DRC is at the 4th place in the population ranking list in Africa, and by its territory, it’s the second largest country on the continent. Although the country is large in territory, the multi-ethnicity and divided religious share make it a challenging job to control the whole country and unite people within it.
DRC is mainly known for its mineral resources. North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Katanga regions are the main territories for the most important mineral resources. Besides silver, coal and palladium, DRC is rich in cobalt (critically important for battery production), copper, gold, diamond, and coltan, which is essential for electronics manufacturing. The state’s economy is heavily dependent on these resources, since 25% of the country’s GDP comes from overall exportation, and 95% of exportation is mineral export. (World Bank Statistics) The importance of these easter regions is unquestionable and globally known. For this reason, neighbouring countries and rebel military groups can see these territories as potential targets, in order to weaken DRC, and strengthen their own economy and regional position. Since the Congolese government faced several challenges since the millennium, the weakened political power allowed different rebel groups to strengthen their presence in the country and divide the different Congolese ethnical groups against each other.
The M23 military rebel groups and the de-stabilization of North-Kivu
In April 2012, members of different rebel groups united and mutinied against the Congolese government. The main original problem for the rebels was that the government did not unite their military with the official Congolese army, but soon the rebels found more motivative reasons to fight against the DRC. The M23 group’s ethnical composition is complex, but the majority of the rebels are Tutsi fighters. Tutsis are an important ethnical group, mostly located around the Great Lakes region of Africa. Tutsi people are in the majority of Rwanda’s and Uganda’s regions close to the DRC border and also can be found in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. For these rebel fighters, an extra motivation was the fact that within the DRC, they usually suffered from discrimination, and the assimilation progress did not go through as it was expected. During the summer of 2012, the M23 rebels captured the city of Goma, which is the capital of the North Kivu province.
As it was already mentioned above, this province is a key region for the DRC’s economy, so therefore the Congolese government immediately deployed its army, to regain power over the region. Besides the Congolese soldiers, the United Nations Intervention Brigade also got deployed here, to help the re-stabilization of the region. By the beginning of 2013, the North-Kivu region was re-claimed from the rebel military group, and most of the M23 fighters fled straight to Rwanda and Uganda. Until 2021, the Congolese people experienced more or less un-disturbed peace, until at the beginning of the year the re-militarized and strengthened rebel groups started their offensive against North-Kivu once more.
Since 2021, the Congolese government has struggled to gain back full authority over North-, and South-Kivu provinces. The reason for the lack of success is the unforeseen strengthening of the M23 rebel group. Some sources and most of the Congolese political figures say the military groups are supported by the DRC’s two neighbour countries, Rwanda and Uganda. The motives for these countries are clearly the economic advance they can take from these provinces. Besides the Congolese government, United Nations experts also reported black trading between M23, Rwanda and Uganda. The rebel military group took control over the most important mineral mines, and delivered the minerals to Kigali and Kampala, in exchange for military support in the fights against the DRC.
The fights in the province hinder the work of the Congolese government in several ways. Since the government lost access to many of the local mines, the government suffers financial loss every day because they can not process mining, and they can’t produce for export. Also, they have to pay high prices for the continuous fights in the region, which pushes the state into an even weaker economic position. And the third most important effect of the fights is the migration of the local society. Congolese people are forced to leave their homes in order to save their lives. In 2023, approximately 3 million people had to migrate from their homes. Most of these people try to relocate within the DRC, but many of them are leaving the state and looking for safe places in Rwanda or Uganda. The re-location of these people within the DRC is again a new challenge the government must face, since most of these people struggle to find new jobs and proper accommodation, and the government must support them financially, which again, puts the state into an even harder financial situation. At the same time, Rwanda and Uganda are getting under international pressure, since these states are acting against multiple international agreements and laws. Most importantly, Rwanda hosted several meetings for M23 generals, where multiple persons showed up, even though they were on multiple UN sanction lists. Rwanda did not fulfil its job of capturing these figures, which made the country become a target for international pressure. Also, in multiple UN reports from 2024, we find information about approximately 3,000-4,000 Rwandan soldiers fighting beside M23 soldiers against the Congolese army. These reports say Rwanda collects every boy above the age of 12 from the refugee camps in the e country and sends them to training camps to become soldiers. From the age of 15, it is common to send them straight to the frontline to fight for the captured villages and mines in North-Kivu.
The same reports also criticized the Congolese government, for their new alliances with paramilitary forces. The most relevant military group is the Wazalendo group. They are not a long-standing and unified militia, but rather an alliance between localized armed groups. Many of the current members are former rebels, some of whom were even considered as anti-government actors before. The motivation behind their alliance is simple. The DRC realized they could not defeat the M23 on their own, so they needed local proxy forces to help them in the fights, and the members of Wazalendo were more against the aggressor M23 militia who were taking their territory away, than the Congolese government. This alliance between Kinshasa and the Wazalendo group brought criticism to the government since members of the Wazalendo militia are known to break Human Rights multiple times, and they violated many international laws during their operation. On the other hand, the DRC has been seeking help from the International Community for a long time now, and as we can see, real useful help has not arrived since 2021. The government knows they simply can not let the situation escalate, or stay like this because that would lead to an economic collapse of the country, so they try to solve the problem with the possibilities they have in their hands.
Since 2024, different actors have gained, and lost territories is a daily occurrence in the North-Kivu province. The belongings of multiple mines are changing day by day. Most of the region is still under the control of M23, and the full reclaim of the province seems to be far for Kinshasa. It also complicates the situation for the DRC that based on the last reports, some Wazalendo leaders are in illegal trade with the M23. Reports say that in some cases minerals from reclaimed mines, where the authority is in the hand of the Wazalendo militia again, are taken to M23 territory, in exchange for a great price. The lack of trust between the DRC and the Wazalendo group makes it even more difficult for Kinshasa to stabilize the situation.
Global actors’ reaction to the escalated situation
On February 19, 2024, the European Union (EU) and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to strengthen cooperation on sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials. This agreement aims to integrate sustainable raw materials value chains, mobilize funding for infrastructure projects, and collaborate on research and innovation. Rwanda is a significant global player in mining tantalum, tin, tungsten, gold, and niobium, with potential for lithium and rare earth elements. However, it is important to highlight that, it is not possible to track every kg of mineral through the supply chain to see whether those minerals are really from Rwanda, or were stolen from the DRC, but it is clear that since 2021, the mineral export of Rwanda is higher, than the mineral production within the country. Last year, Congolese finance minister Nicolas Kazadi said his country’s economy was losing $1bn a year in minerals through the illicit trade.
These mines are still on the list of the most important mineral resources list. In 2024, Apple got sued by the Congolese government for buying Congolese minerals from Rwanda in order to keep up with the expanding market needs. In December 2024, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed a landmark legal case against Apple for allegedly sourcing „blood minerals” from conflict zones within the country. These minerals – primarily tin, tungsten, tantalum (3T), and cobalt – are essential components in the production of smartphones and other electronic devices.
The DRC government accuses Apple of indirectly supporting armed groups, such as the M23 m
militia, which controls and exploits mineral-rich regions in the eastern part of the country. The case alleges that armed groups use the proceeds from mineral mining to fund their activities, perpetuating cycles of violence, displacement, and human rights abuses, including forced labour and child exploitation. The DRC argues that Apple has failed to ensure transparency and ethical sourcing within its supply chain, despite global regulations and guidelines aimed at curbing the trade of conflict minerals. Apple, on its part, has denied the allegations and reiterated its commitment to ethical sourcing. The company claims to adopt stronger guidelines, such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals and insists that it conducts regular audits of its suppliers to avoid conflict-related sourcing.
What does the society of the Democratic Republic of Congo think about the situation?
Although it is really hard to gain one comprehensive opinion, the current failure of Rwanda – DRC negotiations is clearly not favoured by the DRC’s society. The current DRC president, Felix Tshisekedi made it clear, that they are ready to negotiate with Rwanda about a potential ceasefire, but under no circumstances they will negotiate with the M23 leaders. The negotiations took place in Angola and progressed well until the leaders from Angola and Rwanda started to force DRC to let M23 leaders join the negotiations, in order to make an impactful ceasefire. President Tshisekedi froze the negotiations, which had an unfortunate effect on the DRC society. People from Congo now push the government to end the war with military success, which is obviously not that simple, and in the current situation more likely seems to be irrational. As we look into the future, the possibility of solving this military case with only military power seems unlikely. Both sides have enough military support, and as time goes forward, the DRC suffers more and more financial fallback, and dissatisfaction by the society, while at the same time, Rwanda is strengthening its economy and military presence, which puts Kinshasa into an even more challenging situation. The presence of global actors like Apple makes the problem more complex since these global actors sometimes have bigger influences than some states. Until Apple and other actors are legally allowed to gain an advantage on the illegal use of DRC’s minerals, the solution is getting further away from Kinshasa, and the government will face challenges they might not be able to solve on their own.
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