The Evolution of Diplomatic Engagement in the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–2026) 2/3

Szerző: Külpologika | ápr 20, 2026 | Elemzés, Foreign Relations, Háború

Written by: Elena Moiseeva

3. The Resurgence: Normalisation of US-Ukraine relations and diplomatic contact with Russia

After the Oval Office rupture, Volodymyr Zelensky pivoted from confrontation to transactional damage control: not because Kyiv’s substantive positions suddenly softened, but because the relationship itself became a material variable in sustaining U.S. support. One visible indicator of this recalibration was the wardrobe issue: after the February meeting controversy – where he was publicly challenged for not wearing a suit and the White House circle signalled displeasure – Zelensky began adopting a more formal, “calibrated” look (still martial-coded, but closer to U.S. elite expectations) as a deliberate gesture of respect and de-escalation towards Donald Trump. In functional terms, this was not about clothing; it was a low-cost concession in protocol and symbolism aimed at reopening influence channels in a highly personalised diplomatic environment.

That partial “re-normalisation” of optics then enabled a broader strategic shift in Washington: Trump could treat Ukraine less as a co-equal principal shaping the term, and more as a party to be brought into line after a great-power bargain defined the outer envelope. This is the connective logic to the next section: the U.S.–Russia summit in Anchorage (mid-August 2025) becomes intelligible as the institutionalisation of bilateralisation – an attempt to settle parameters directly with Vladimir Putin first, then translate them into a compliance problem for Kyiv – precisely the move made politically easier once Zelensky had signalled a willingness to play by Trump’s performative and transactional rules.

3.1. The U.S.–Russia bilateral channel: the Alaska inflexion point (2025)

The return of Donald Trump to office in 2025, as we have already seen, also created a parallel diplomatic lane in which the United States sought to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin, rather than treating Kyiv as the sole “front door” for any settlement. The core structural feature of this lane was exclusion: Volodymyr Zelensky was not invited to the leader-level meeting in Anchorage, and no agreement was announced at its conclusion. The first attempts at this were separate Trump-Putin phone calls and eventually culminated in a meeting in Alaska – a symbolic choice of the venue, as it represented a part of shared Russian-American history, and a previous precedent of a successful transactional relationship.

3.2 The Alaska summit (15 August 2025)

The summit took place on 15 August 2025 at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson. Reuters reporting indicates that no matter the performative optics and the absence of a formal deal, the meeting nevertheless crystallised the bargaining space around territorial lines, sanctions relief, and the sequencing problem (ceasefire-first versus settlement-first). Reuters described Putin pressing a package in which Ukraine would withdraw from all of Donbas (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast) in exchange for Russia freezing frontlines in Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast; sources also pointed to expectations around a non-NATO status for Ukraine and at least partial sanctions relief, while Kyiv rejected the core territorial logic.

Two composition details matter analytically. First, the “summit entourage” reportedly included economic principles, which is a classic indicator that the Kremlin’s preferred endgame is not merely a line on the map, but sanctions unwind plus reintegration in selective sectors. Second, the US side combined formal state authority with personalised channels: leader diplomacy backed by a small circle rather than a large interagency process. That is an efficiency play (speed, discretion, deniability), but it also tends to narrow the agenda to what can be traded politically (territory, guarantees, and macro-level quid pro quos) rather than what can be “engineered” institutionally.

3.3 From “talks” to an alleged “formula”

By January 2026, Reuters reporting described Moscow referencing an “Anchorage formula” (Russia’s label) that it claimed was agreed in Alaska: full Russian control of all Donbas, coupled with freezing frontlines elsewhere in the east and south. Importantly, this is not an authenticated joint communiqué; it is best read as a Russian attempt to “lock in” a particular interpretation of the Alaska bargaining range and to use that interpretation as leverage in subsequent trilateral settings. The overall conclusion of the meeting is still one that brought no practical breakthrough, to the big disillusionment of Trump, who believed that after subduing Zelensky, he would be able to strike a deal with Putin using his personal oversight.

3.4 The New York contact (24 September 2025)

The Marco Rubio–Sergey Lavrov meeting on the margins of the UN week in New York (reported at roughly 50 minutes) functioned less as a “grand bargain” venue and more as a revalidation of a working channel after public oscillations in Trump’s rhetoric following the unremarkable conclusion of the meeting in Alaska. The presence of Mike Waltz and delegations on both sides is consistent with an intent to keep the Ukraine file tied to broader bilateral messaging, without committing to a formal negotiating track at that stage.

4. The U.S.–Ukraine channel: translating great-power bargaining into Ukrainian consent (late 2025–early 2026)

If Alaska established the outer boundaries of what Washington and Moscow were willing to discuss, the subsequent U.S.–Ukraine meetings were about coercive alignment: converting an externally-shaped bargaining range into something Kyiv could plausibly sign without immediate domestic delegitimising.

4.1 Geneva (from 23 November 2025)

The Geneva round in Geneva formalised this dynamic. The U.S. delegation combined institutional authority with political envoys: Rubio alongside Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Daniel Driscoll; the Ukrainian side was led by Andriy Yermak (Head of the Office of the President). Reuters characterised the output as an “updated and refined” framework built around a U.S. 28-point plan, with unresolved core issues including territory, force-structure limits, and NATO-related constraints; European partners circulated a counter-proposal pushing back on the most constraining elements (notably on the size of Ukraine’s peacetime force and on how territorial talks should be sequenced). The delegation composition itself signals what the talks were about. Driscoll’s presence is an overt cue that “security guarantees” were not being treated as abstract diplomacy but as a force-planning and postwar posture question (capability ceilings, basing/partners, and enforceability). Conversely, having the Ukrainian side led by the presidential office (rather than, say, a foreign ministry-led format) indicates a highly centralised decision structure: the negotiation is framed as a presidential mandate problem – how to reconcile external pressure with constitutional constraints, coalition politics, and wartime legitimacy – rather than as a conventional treaty-drafting exercise.

The American Delegation and its significance

Steve Witkoff: Witkoff is a property developer turned presidential envoy who has become a principal external channel for high-level bargaining, including direct engagement with Moscow and Kyiv. Reporting repeatedly frames him as a Trump-trusted negotiator rather than a conventional diplomat, with influence derived from proximity to the president and a mandate to push outcomes quickly – often by applying blunt political pressure rather than building multilateral consensus. His presence shows the White House’s preference for personalised backchannel diplomacy and “deliverable”-oriented bargaining (ceasefires, swaps, freezes) that can be claimed as immediate wins, even if strategic trade-offs remain unresolved.
Jared Kushner: His portfolio is informal authority, political capital, and conflict-of-interest risk. Kushner re-enters the process not as a formal officeholder but as a politically embedded operator with direct access to the president and long experience in high-stakes negotiation theatre. His involvement has been widely reported as unofficial but consequential, and it carries an unavoidable optics problem: his private business interests – via Affinity Partners and related international networks – invite scrutiny over perceived (or real) conflicts between statecraft and private gain. His person signifies a diplomacy that is family-networked and politically insulated, capable of bypassing interagency friction, but structurally vulnerable to legitimacy challenges (European buy-in, Ukrainian trust, congressional scrutiny) because the line between public mandate and private interest is easier to contest.
Daniel Driscoll: His prominence is analytically striking because he is not a diplomat; he is the civilian head of the U.S. Army with a profile framed around disruption, modernisation, and adaptation to contemporary warfare. Some reporting has described him as an unexpected point man in the broader peace effort, underlining how far the process has shifted toward security-implementation logic rather than classical treaty craft. His involvement displays an emphasis on enforceable mechanics – ceasefire monitoring, force posture, security guarantees, and the management of aid as leverage – paired with a view of the war as a driver of U.S. military modernisation (not least lessons drawn from drone-intensive combat).

4.2 The 28-point Plan

By late 2025, a comprehensive peace proposal, drafted by US envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, was circulating in diplomatic capitals. The plan, often referred to as the „28-Point Plan,” represented a shift toward a „frozen conflict” model favourable to Russian interests. Here it’s important to note that Dmitriev functions as the Kremlin’s economic negotiator-in-chief. An RDIF sovereign wealth fund executive, sanctioned by the U.S., whom Putin elevated in 2025 to a special envoy role focused on investment and international economic cooperation. His insertion into the peace process signals that Moscow is treating war-termination as an economic package deal – where ceasefire and territorial mechanics are negotiated alongside sanctions sequencing, access to capital, and reconstruction/investment channels – using a Western-fluent operator designed to speak the language of transactional bargaining.

Key Provisions of the 28-point plan:

Territorial Concessions: The plan called for the recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. It proposed freezing the front lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, leaving Russia in de facto control of significant territories. This can largely be interpreted as Russia sticking to the “Alaska-format”, discussed earlier.
Demilitarisation: A cap on the Ukrainian Armed Forces was proposed at 600,000 troops. While this is a significant increase from the 50,000 demanded by Russia in 2022, it imposes a hard limit on Ukraine’s defence capabilities.
NATO Status: Ukraine would be required to amend its constitution to permanently rule out NATO membership. The plan explicitly stated that „NATO will not expand further” and that no NATO troops would be stationed in Ukraine.
Economic Reintegration: A controversial clause proposed the lifting of sanctions on Russia and an invitation for Moscow to rejoin the G8 (formerly G7), reintegrating Russia into the global economic elite.
Security Guarantees: Ukraine would receive „reliable security guarantees,” monitored by a „Peace Council” chaired by President Donald Trump. Crucially, these guarantees were tied to strict conditions: if Ukraine were to launch missiles at Moscow or invade Russian territory, the guarantees would be voided.
Elections: Ukraine would be required to hold elections within 100 days of the agreement – a timeline critics argued was impossible given the displacement of millions of voters.
Language and Culture: The plan included provisions mandated by Russia regarding the protection of the Russian language and the banning of „Nazi ideology,” echoing the 2022 demands.

4.3 The European Counterproposal

In response to the US plan, a coalition of European nations led by France, Germany, and the UK submitted a counterproposal to mitigate the concessions required of Ukraine.

Key Differences: The European plan rejected the legal recognition of annexed territories (accepting only a de facto freeze). It removed the ban on NATO membership from the constitution (though accepting a practical pause). It proposed higher troop caps and stronger, „Article 5-style” security guarantees that were less conditional than the US version.
Russian Reaction: The Kremlin, through aide Yuri Ushakov, dismissed the European counterproposal as „completely unconstructive,” preferring the US draft, which offered sanctions relief and territorial recognition.

4.4 The „28-Point Plan” vs European Counterproposal (2025)

Issue	US „28-Point Plan”	European Counterproposal
Territory	Recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk.	Freeze front lines only; no legal recognition of annexed territory.
NATO	Constitutional amendment banning NATO membership.	Pause on membership, but no constitutional ban.
Troop Caps	Ukrainian Armed Forces limited to 600,000.	Higher caps; less restrictive on Defence capabilities.
Sanctions	Lift sanctions: Russia invited to rejoin G8.	Sanctions relief tied to reparations; no G8 invitation.
Security	„Reliable guarantees” monitored by the Trump-led Council.	„Article 5-style” guarantees by the Coalition of the Willing.
Elections	To be held within 100 days.	„As soon as possible” (recognising logistical reality).

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-2022-peace-proposal-was-a-blueprint-for-the-destruction-of-ukraine/