The Evolution of Diplomatic Engagement in the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–2026) 3/3

Szerző: Külpologika | ápr 21, 2026 | Elemzés, Foreign Relations, Háború

Written by: Elena Moiseeva

4.5 The Collapse of the Budapest Summit (October 2025)

The diplomatic efforts were scheduled to culminate in a summit in Budapest in October 2025, hosted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a figure seen as acceptable to both Trump and Putin. However, the summit was cancelled days after its announcement. The proximate cause was Vladimir Putin’s intransigence. Despite the massive concessions offered by the U.S. plan, Putin sensed weakness. During a five-hour meeting with Witkoff in the Kremlin, Putin offered nothing on the key issues of territory or security. He correctly calculated that the U.S. administration was desperate for a deal and that European unity was fracturing. Furthermore, the cancellation was driven by „profound transatlantic strategic differences”. Polish and Baltic leaders made it clear they would not endorse a „Munich-style” agreement that partitioned Ukraine. The collapse of the Budapest initiative left the U.S. administration humiliated and the peace process in tatters.

All the while the Zelensky administration was fighting for its survival on the international stage, it was struck by a catastrophic internal blow. In late 2025, a corruption scandal of massive proportions engulfed the President’s Office, targeting Andriy Yermak, the Chief of Staff and the second most powerful man in Ukraine. The crisis reached its peak on a Friday in late 2025 (or very early 2026), when anti-corruption investigators raided Yermak’s private residence and office. The imagery of law enforcement searching the home of the President’s right-hand man was politically devastating. Facing an ultimatum from Western partners – particularly the European Union, which made further financial support contingent on a cleanup of the administration – Zelensky made the difficult decision to cut ties with his closest confidant. In a video address, Zelensky announced Yermak’s resignation, framing it as a necessary „reset” to preserve national unity. The departure of Yermak created a power vacuum in Kyiv. He had been the primary interlocutor with the White House, the architect of the Peace Formula, and the gatekeeper of the presidency. His removal forced a complete restructuring of the Ukrainian negotiating team.

The new delegation, appointed in January 2026, was designed to be less personalised and more institutional. It was led by a troika:

Andrii Hnatov: A representative of the Armed Forces, signalling that the military would have a veto over any security arrangements.
Andrii Sybiha: The Foreign Minister, representing the professional diplomatic corps.
Rustem Umerov: The Head of the Security Council (and former Defence Minister), representing the intelligence and security apparatus.

4.6 Davos (22 January 2026)

The meeting in Davos then moved the bargaining back to leader-level politics. Reuters reported that Zelensky said the terms of security guarantees had been finalised, while the territorial question remained unresolved; it also reported an accompanying push on economic recovery arrangements and that U.S. envoys were travelling onward for talks in Moscow, with trilateral meetings (including Russia) expected shortly thereafter in Abu Dhabi.

Participants:

US Delegation: Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Advisor Jared Kushner, Army Secretary Dan Driscoll.
Ukrainian Delegation: Led by Rustem Umerov, Secretary of the National Security and defence Council, who led meetings on security guarantees and recovery, Davyd Arakhamia and Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the Presidential Office also participated.
European Allies: Security advisors from the UK, France, and Germany were present to coordinate the European position.

The Geneva talks were focused on aligning the US and Ukrainian positions before engaging Russia. The White House described the meetings as „productive,” claiming Ukraine accepted the framework of the peace proposal. However, significant friction remained. President Zelensky later noted that while „90%” of the deal was agreed, the issue of ceding territory remained a major obstacle. The Ukrainian delegation emphasised that security guarantees must be „credible and enforceable,” referencing the failure of previous assurances like the Budapest Memorandum.

5. The Abu Dhabi Process (January – February 2026)

As of early 2026, the centre of gravity for negotiations shifted to the United Arab Emirates. The choice of Abu Dhabi reflected the Gulf state’s neutrality and its ability to host Russian officials who might face travel restrictions in Europe.

Round 1 (January 23–24, 2026):

Format: Trilateral (US-Russia-Ukraine) working groups focused on security issues.
Key Attendees:
- Russia: Igor Kostyukov (GRU Head), Representatives of the Ministry of Defence.
- Ukraine: Rustem Umerov (Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, former Defence Minister), Kyrylo Budanov (GUR Head), Davyd Arakhamia.
- US: Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner.

The „Miami Channel” (January 31, 2026):

A critical backchannel meeting occurred in Miami, Florida, between Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev.

Significance: This bilateral US-Russia meeting focused heavily on the economic aspects of the deal – specifically the mechanism for lifting sanctions and unfreezing Russian assets. The presence of US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is a telltale sign of the financial nature of these discussions.
Outcome: Both sides termed the talks „constructive,” paving the way for the second round of Abu Dhabi talks.

Round 2 (Scheduled February 4-5, 2026): Originally planned for February 1, these talks were delayed slightly but remained the primary venue for finalising the ceasefire terms. Zelensky confirmed Ukraine’s readiness for „substantive talks” aimed at a „dignified end to the war”.

6. Conclusion: What Delegation Composition Reveals About the Peace Process

The changing composition of the delegations from 2022 to 2026 offers the most profound insight into the trajectory of the war.

From Identity to Assets: In 2022, Russia sent Medinsky, a man obsessed with history books and cultural identity. The war was about the „soul” of the Russian World. In 2026, Russia sends Dmitriev, a sovereign wealth fund manager. The war is now about assets, sanctions, and economic survival. The shift from cultural grievance to financial transaction is total.
The Militarisation of Diplomacy: In 2022, Ukraine sent a diverse political coalition. In 2026, the delegation is almost entirely comprised of Defence and Intelligence officials (Umerov, Budanov, Fomin, Kostyukov). This suggests that political trust is dead. The only valid currency remaining is hard security: how many troops, where they are stationed, and who guarantees the peace. The „diplomats” have effectively left the room, replaced by the generals and spies who will have to enforce the ceasefire.
The Privatisation of Mediation: The entry of Witkoff and Kushner – private sector figures with personal ties to Trump – suggests that the peace process has been personalised. It is no longer an inter-state dialogue managed by the State Department, but a „deal” being brokered by the White House’s inner circle, utilising personal backchannels (Dmitriev-Witkoff) rather than formal diplomatic cables.

Conclusion

From 2022 to early 2026, the negotiation track has shifted from ad hoc political contacts to a more compartmentalised structure in which implementation and sequencing matter more than public-facing declarations. The early phase (meetings around Belarus, Antalya, and Istanbul) combined maximalist positions with weak prospects for credible guarantees. After that breakdown, diplomacy largely moved into narrow transactional arrangements (humanitarian exchanges, limited technical deals) rather than settlement bargaining.

What is distinctive in the late-2025/early-2026 phase is the prominence of security and intelligence actors and the clearer separation of tracks: operational ceasefire mechanics and monitoring on the one hand, and sanctions/economic issues on the other. This is consistent with a context of very low political trust: the process becomes less about producing a comprehensive peace text and more about defining rules that can be executed and verified.

Delegation composition is therefore analytically useful. When Moscow sends ideological-political figures such as Vladimir Medinsky, the talks tend to emphasise narratives and maximalist framing. When the U.S. relies on personal envoys—Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Daniel Driscoll—the style is typically centralised and transactional, with fewer institutional “buffers” than a classic State Department-led process. When Russia’s economic track is represented by Kirill Dmitriev, it indicates that sanctions relief and capital access are treated as core variables rather than secondary issues.

None of this implies that a durable settlement is imminent. A security-professional format can plausibly produce limited, enforceable arrangements (temporary ceasefires, verification protocols, exchange mechanisms). It is less well-suited to resolving legitimacy-sensitive questions (sovereignty, territorial recognition, long-term alignment) unless those are later absorbed into a broader political and legal ratification process. The main analytic point is modest: the current format is structurally better at producing manageable de-escalation than it is at producing a fully stabilised peace.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-2022-peace-proposal-was-a-blueprint-for-the-destruction-of-ukraine/